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ABSTRACT 
Corruption in Vietnam is a national concern which could derail health sector goals for equity, 
access, and quality. Yet, there is little research on vulnerabilities to corruption or associated 
factors at the sectoral level. This article examines current patterns of corruption in Vietnam’s 
health sector, identifies key corruption vulnerabilities, and reviews strategies for addressing 
corruption in the future. The article builds on the findings and discussion at the sixth Anti-
Corruption Dialogue between the Vietnamese Government and the international donor 
community. Development partners, government agencies, Vietnamese and international 
non-governmental organizations, media representatives and other stakeholders explored 
what is known about important problems such as informal payments, procurement 
corruption, and health insurance fraud. The participants proposed corruption-reduction 
interventions in the areas of administrative oversight, transparency initiatives and civil 
society participation, and health reforms to change incentives. The analysis assesses the 
prospects for success of these interventions given the Vietnamese institutional context, and 
draws conclusions relevant to addressing health sector corruption in other countries.  
 
Keywords: corruption, Vietnam, informal payments, health reform, health insurance fraud, 
procurement   
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Strong health systems are essential for improved health outcomes. Increasingly, 
development partners such as the World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO) and the 
Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) are putting health systems 
strengthening at the top of the agenda for global health, supporting efforts to transform 
health systems to expand access, coverage, quality, and efficiency of health services. 
Governance is one of the building blocks of strong health systems. With good governance, 
policy makers and leaders are able to align financing and human resources with policy 
objectives, procure medical supplies efficiently and effectively, and deliver quality services 
that people want and need (WHO, 2007).  
Corruption, defined as abuse of entrusted power for private gain, is a major threat to health 
system performance (T. Vian, 2008). Theft of medical supplies from facilities and the 
practice of extorting informal or ―envelope‖ payments decreases demand for services and 
prevents quality service delivery. Absenteeism and an internal ―market‖ for positions make it 
difficult to have competent people in the right jobs and to use human resources efficiently. 
Weak financial systems allow opportunities for embezzlement and permit limited resources 
to be spent on non-priority activities or to support networks of patronage rather than 
maximizing health benefits. Where citizens lack information, they do not have the tools they 
need to participate in policy decision making or hold their government accountable for 
performance. Good governance in support of strong health systems therefore requires 
effective control of corruption (Lewis, 2006; Taryn Vian et al., 2010).  
In Vietnam, the government and donors are increasingly concerned about corruption. A 
governance study in 2004 identified control of corruption as a key challenge in the country 
(World Bank, 2005). After passing a new Anti-Corruption law in 2005, the Government 
established a Central Steering Committee for Anti-corruption (CSCAC) headed by the Prime 
Minister to coordinate implementation on anti-corruption efforts. Regional committees on 
anti-corruption were also established, a specialized Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) was 
created within the Government Inspectorate, and special anti-corruption units were placed 
within the Ministry of Public Security and at the People’s Supreme Court, charged with 
monitoring, detection and enforcement (T. T. T. Ha et al., 2011). 
Yet, perceptions of corruption are still high: in 2008, 85% of citizens perceived corruption in 
central-level health services, while 65% perceived corruption in local health services (World 
Bank, 2010a). National surveys in 2006 and 2009 found that while Vietnam’s anti-corruption 
law is strong, enforcement and monitoring are weak (Global Integrity, 2006, 2009; 
Transparency International, 2006). Politicized institutions, overlapping mandates, 
widespread nepotism, and restrictions on freedom of expression are persistent challenges to 
good governance, while weak public administration systems for functions such as financial 
management and procurement are also a problem (Global Integrity, 2006, 2009; Jones, 
2009; World Bank, 2005). Anti-corruption approaches need to take into account such 
institutional constraints and characteristics (Fritzen, 2005). This is especially important when 
mainstreaming anti-corruption policies and programs in specific sectors such as health 
(UNDP, 2008). 
At present in Vietnam there is little research on corruption risks or associated factors at the 
sectoral level. This article seeks to fill this gap by examining patterns of corruption in 
Vietnam’s health sector, identifying key risks, and analyzing possible strategies for 
addressing corruption in the future. The article builds on the findings and discussion at the 
Donors Roundtable held as part of the sixth Anti-Corruption Dialogue between the 
Vietnamese Government and the international donor community (hereafter the ―Roundtable‖) 
in November 2009 (Towards Transparency & Embassy of Sweden, 2010). At that meeting, 
development partners, government agencies, Vietnamese and international non-
governmental organizations, media representatives and other stakeholders explored what is 
known about important problems such as envelope payments to medical staff, corruption in 
the pharmaceutical supply system, and health insurance fraud. The participants proposed 
Confronting Corruption in the Health Sector in Vietnam  HDDP 14 
 
 3 
interventions in the areas of enhanced administrative oversight, transparency, and structural 
health reforms. The analysis assesses the prospects for success of these interventions 
given the Vietnamese institutional context, and draws conclusions relevant to addressing 
health sector corruption in other countries.   
BACKGROUND ON THE VIETNAMESE HEALTH SECTOR 
Patterns of corruption vary depending on how funds are mobilized, managed, and paid to 
providers (W. D. Savedoff & Hussmann, 2006). It is helpful, therefore, to describe the actual 
relationships, responsibilities, and health financing systems in Vietnam in order to 
understand the context in which corruption risks arise. 
Vietnam is a middle income East Asian country of 86 million with a per capita GDP of $1,051 
in 2009. In 1986, the government committed to a political reform and development strategy 
based on a market economy with socialist orientation, referred to as doi moi (renovation). 
This resulted in the introduction of market forces in the health system as well as changes to 
health care financing (Gabriele, 2006). Some of these changes included legalization of 
private medical practice in 1986, de-regulation of the pharmaceutical market in 1989, 
introduction of mandatory state-funded and voluntary health insurance programs in 1993, 
and financial decentralization based on cost recovery principles (Ekman et al., 2008; Fritzen, 
2007; Gabriele, 2006; A. T. Nguyen et al., 2010; Phuong, 2009). In 2002, the government 
expanded financial autonomy in government health care facilities, giving hospitals the 
flexibility to raise remuneration as well as expanding interactions with private and non-state 
actors (T. T. T. Ha et al., 2011). In addition, policy reforms have increased the role of private 
clinics and companies, and private financing, in delivery of health services. 
About 42-49% of patients are covered by health insurance programs (Ekman et al., 2008; 
Phuong, 2009). Higher level care is mainly delivered in public hospitals, outpatient care is 
sought in public and private facilities, and most pharmaceuticals are purchased without 
prescription in the private sector (Ekman et al., 2008). Recently, efforts have also been 
made to revitalize the network of public, primary health care clinics, called commune health 
centers, which serve rural populations (Fritzen, 2007). 
While the liberalization of the Vietnamese economy initially helped promote fast growth and 
was successful at alleviating poverty (Gabriele, 2006), the effects on the health sector have 
been less positive over time (B. T. Ha et al., 2010). Health sector reforms have resulted in 
more choices for treatment and fewer protections for patients, increasing overall health care 
costs while placing a substantial burden on households and exacerbating income inequality 
(P. Nguyen et al., 2009b). Health care spending as a percentage of GDP is high in Vietnam: 
7.1% in 2007, compared to 3.7% in Thailand, 4.4% in Malaysia, and 4.3% in China (World 
Bank, 2010b). However, a very large proportion of health spending is out-of-pocket (B. T. Ha 
et al., 2010) and the burden of health care costs is limiting access to care. In 2006, 
household out-of-pocket payments accounted for 61% of total health expenditures (Phuong, 
2009). Moreover, the poor spend a higher percentage of income on health compared to less 
poor households, and for the poorest quintile of the population nearly 15% of non-food 
expenditures go for medicines (World Bank, 2010a). Economic shock from ill health is the 
most common cause of poverty, pushing an estimated three million people per year below 
the poverty line due to the burden of paying for catastrophic illness (Thanh et al., 2010). 
Medicines account for over 50% of total health care expenditures in 2005 (A. T. Nguyen et 
al., 2009a) and rising prices are a concern. A study of medicines prices, availability and 
affordability in five regions of the country found that public procurement prices paid by 
facilities were 8.3 times the international reference prices for brand name drugs, and 1.8 
times the international reference prices for lowest-price generic drugs, while prices to 
patients were 46.6 and 11.4 times the international reference prices for brand name and 
generic drugs, respectively (A. T. Nguyen et al., 2009a; A. T. Nguyen et al., 2010). At the 
same time, low-priced generic drugs were generally less available in public sector facilities 
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compared to brand name drugs. In contrast to most other countries, medicine prices were 
higher in the public sector than in the private sector, and were unaffordable for the lowest 
paid government workers or others earning similar wages (A. T. Nguyen et al., 2009a; A. T. 
Nguyen et al., 2010). High prices may be due to corruption in procurement systems: in a 
2005 survey of business opinions on the frequency of bribery in public procurement, Vietnam 
scored a low 3.0 out of 7 (with 1 being ―common‖ and 7 being ―never‖) (Jones, 2009). 
Overuse and irrational prescribing of drugs are also persistent problems (Chang & Trivedi, 
2003; Larsson et al., 2000). 
HEALTH GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
Fritzen (2005) argues that the key to predicting success or failure in implementation of anti-
corruption measures lies in institutional constraints: in the case of Vietnam, the role of the 
authoritarian state is an important factor. According to Fritzen, while political will for 
combating corruption in Vietnam is high, approaches to anti-corruption have been hampered 
by factors such as the dominance of powerful actors in policy-making, unclear 
responsibilities for oversight, lack of resources, and a state-centric system that leaves little 
scope for civil society activity (Fritzen, 2005). Table 1 summarizes national anti-corruption 
approaches, institutional constraints, and the impact of these factors on reform progress in 
Vietnam.  
Table 1: Institutional Constraints Affecting Anti-Corruption Approaches 
Vietnam Anti-
Corruption 
Approach 
Institutional Constraints to 
Implementation and Effectiveness 
Result 
Enhanced 
administrative 
oversight and 
inspections (e.g. 
asset disclosure, 
technical audits) 
 Executive dominance: executive 
authority is uncontestable, few 
checks and balances 
 Bureaucratic fragmentation: results 
in weak authority relationships and 
unclear oversight roles between 
executive and non-executive actors 
 Under-resourced enforcement 
efforts, lack of investigation capacity 
 Weak incentives for 
enforcement. Actors in 
system resist or evade 
stepped-up enforcement 
efforts. Particularistic interests 
of executive win out. 
 Policies vulnerable to reversal 
at implementation stage. 
 Low numbers of employees 
disciplined. 
Transparency and 
citizen complaints & 
participation (e.g. 
financial 
transparency, 
independent 
monitoring) 
 State-centric system leaves little 
scope and few organizational 
platforms for civil society. 
 Civil society characterized by many 
smaller, informal organizations, 
rather than strong mass 
organizations.  
 Corruption is systemic; transparency 
has less effect on systemic 
corruption so overall effectiveness 
of this strategy is low 
 Range of independent 
political action within civil 
society is limited. 
 Civil society groups unable to 
use information disclosed to 
hold government agents 
accountable. 
 May work in selective settings 
with strong tradition of civic 
engagement 
Administrative and 
structural reform 
(reduce opportunities 
and incentives for 
corruption) 
 Closed and centralized policy 
process produces vague policies 
that give appearance of unity and 
allow party insiders discretionary 
power to interpret as they like 
 Contestation for power and 
influence among elites dominates 
reform incentives; implementation of 
reform is  undermined 
 Reform process is complex, 
conflict-ridden, little 
agreement over controls and 
management 
 Reversals of reform, 
controversies and complaints 
Source: Adapted from Scott Fritzen (2005).  
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In analyzing patterns and risks of corruption in the health sector, we adopt a similar 
institutional perspective. We apply a governance framework (Brinkerhoff & Bossert, 2008) 
that allows us to look closely at roles and level of engagement between health systems 
actors (see Figure 1). These include government agencies (―regulators and payers‖), 
facilities and personnel (―providers‖) and patients or other civil society organizations who 
have an interest in health (―clients‖). Government regulators and payers include Ministry of 
Health, the Vietnam Health Insurance program, the Drug Administration of Vietnam, 
provincial government structures, and other regulatory agencies. Providers include doctors, 
nurses, pharmacists, and health facilities—public, private for-profit, and voluntary—as well 
as suppliers. Clients are represented by patient advocacy groups, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), associations of health professionals, and other civil society groups 
active on health issues (Brinkerhoff & Bossert, 2008). Using this framework, we can begin to 
analyze incentives and where space for abuse exists. 
Figure 1: Health Governance Framework 
 
Source: Brinkerhoff and Bossert, 2008 
 
REGULATORS AND PAYERS 
Government is responsible for system performance and achievement of policy goals 
(Balabanova et al., 2008), including oversight of revenue collection, pooling of funds, and 
paying providers in ways that encourage efficient, quality service availability. Government 
also has a standard setting and regulatory role to assure that medicines are safe and 
effective, individual practitioners are skilled, and facilities are staffed and equipped to assure 
good care.  
The government has expressed concern over equitable access to medicines and has made 
efforts to stabilize prices through regulatory intervention (A. T. Nguyen et al., 2010). In 2003, 
the government began requiring price declaration and publication to ensure transparency, 
although medicine suppliers were still allowed to set prices based on market conditions. 
While this reform shows government commitment to the goal of affordable care, success has 
been limited due to the structure of the regulations and lack of monitoring and enforcement. 
For example, the regulations did not require the declared prices and published prices to be 
reasonable, and tools for assessing reasonableness of prices (such as specifying 
international comparison procedures) were inadequate or incomplete. Since drug suppliers 
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cannot sell at prices above the declared prices, there is an incentive to declare very high 
prices (A. T. Nguyen et al., 2010).  
Studies have shown that providers often do not follow clinical protocols (Bailey et al., 2010), 
and quality of care is weak. The government has tried to address these problems through 
the Law on Examination and Treatment (LET), which was adopted in 2009. The process of 
developing and passing the LET shows some of the weaknesses and strengths of the health 
regulatory environment in Vietnam.  
The LET was designed to update the legal framework for regulating health professions and 
protecting patient rights (Wedeen et al., 2011). The draft law proposed to create an 
independent, accountable and transparent regulatory system for licensing of facilities and 
certification of individual practitioners, with provisions for continuing education, re-licensing, 
and complaints management. A centralized, independent Medical Council would be the 
regulatory body.  
LET was the result of an improved policy development process characterized by the use of 
international evidence, extensive technical consultations, and the first Regulatory Impact 
Assessment ever conducted in the health sector (Wedeen et al., 2011). The process was 
participatory, involving People’s Committees, provincial health authorities, public and private 
hospitals, and professional associations, and drawing on technical assistance through WHO, 
ADB, AusAID and other international organizations. Despite this, key provisions of the draft 
law – the creation of a centralized, independent Medical Council as regulatory authority and 
re-licensing facilities and practitioners – were not adopted. Some of the reasons included the 
Cabinet’s concern that the Medical Council structure did not align with the country’s 
decentralization goals, questions about the appropriateness of relying on a parastatal 
organization for state administrative functions, and the fact that implementation of the re-
licensing provision in the law—which would require new systems and procedures—was not 
aligned with the government’s goal of bureaucratic streamlining for public administration 
reform. 
The revised law approved by the National Assembly is vulnerable to inconsistent 
interpretation and to the forces of corruption, including bribes to issue licenses to individuals 
who have not achieved standards, or to reissue a license that has been revoked (Wedeen et 
al., 2011). In addition, the complaints process specified in the law is to be managed at the 
facility level, which could result in inconsistent application of disciplinary actions and allow 
opportunities for conflict of interest or corruption. 
PROVIDERS  
In addition to bribes related to licensing, as mentioned above, types of corruption arising with 
providers include insurance fraud and over-treatment of patients. Provider payment 
methods, asymmetric information, and conflicts of interest are risk factors. Information 
asymmetry occurs when health providers and consumers of services have unequal 
information about health care needs, service quality, and cost. Conflict of interest occurs 
when a provider has a secondary financial interest which appears to influence the exercise 
of professional practice in providing patient care.  
Insurance fraud involves billing for ghost patients or services not provided. One story 
reported in three newspapers (Lao Dong 03/10/2009, Tuoi Tre 03/10/2009 and Vietnam Net 
19/06/2009) alleged that a hospital in Hanoi had faked 1,500 claims, totaling about 10 billion 
VN Dong (approx. $510,200) before the fraud was detected. In addition, fee-for-service 
insurance reimbursement procedures prompt providers to over-utilize more profitable 
diagnostic and treatment services (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011). This is made possible 
because of information asymmetry: often patients have no other source of information 
except their doctor, especially in rural areas.  
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Another risk is that Vietnamese public hospitals are allowed to contract and share user fee 
revenue with private medical equipment or diagnostic testing companies, bringing profit 
motivations into public service provision without adequate accountability for performance 
(Towards Transparency & Embassy of Sweden, 2010). Weak monitoring systems make it 
difficult to assess whether such public-private partnerships encouraged by government are 
achieving desired outcomes of service expansion and efficiency, or simply enriching the 
particular managers involved. 
The level at which fees are set, and the frequency with which they are updated, is also a 
corruption risk factor. Reimbursement rates for basic patient services such as simple 
diagnostic procedures have not been raised since 1994, which means the fees no longer 
cover true costs. Fees for newer, high tech services were established more recently and 
bear a closer relation to the true cost of these services; however, the price of newer 
technology may be set too high, as experience generally lowers unit costs and volumes 
increase. This creates an incentive for providers to avoid supplying basic services and to 
substitute higher tech services.  
The Key Improvements in Community Health (KICH) project in Hoa Binh province has tried 
to develop measures of treatment patterns, in order to identify inappropriate use of services. 
The project found wide variation in diagnostic testing rates ranging from 6.4 tests per patient 
visit in Lac Thuy versus 0.3 tests per patient visit in Cao Pong and Ky Son hospitals, as 
shown in Figure 2. In addition, the analysis noted that among 200 people who had a CT 
scan, 80% also had an ultrasound, a rate which they considered excessive (Towards 
Transparency & Embassy of Sweden, 2010).  
Figure 2: Variation in number of tests per patient-visit in hospitals, Hoa Binh, 2008 
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Source: Presentation by Birgit Wendling on behalf of the EU Health Sector Working Group 
 
The pharmaceutical distribution system provides another example of how information 
asymmetry can result in abuse of power and over-treatment. Government controls on 
pharmaceutical promotion are weak (Okumura et al., 2002), allowing pharmaceutical 
representatives to influence the choices of doctors and hospitals through ―commissions‖ or 
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kickbacks based on prescribing patterns. An investigation by the Ministry of Health reported 
that 41% of patients studied had received combined antibiotics, 10% of patients had 
received 11-15 types of medicine and 7.7% of patient received three types of antibiotics 
(Acuña-Alfaro, 2009). These numbers indicate irrational drug use and may be caused at 
least in part by the pharmaceutical company incentives to prescribers. Excessive drug 
promotion activities result in inflated spending on pharmaceuticals. According to one media 
story, medicines account for 45% to 60% of hospitalization costs incurred by households 
(Phap Luat, 29/08/2009). Deficiencies in legal and institutional frameworks may also be a 
factor in inflated costs, including loopholes under which open competition bidding can be 
avoided, lack of mandated disclosure of information related to the procurement process, and 
inadequate legal safeguards proscribing conflict of interest (Jones, 2009).  
Finally, informal or ―envelope‖ payments between patients and providers are a growing 
concern. Informal payments are contributions made to health care providers in addition to 
any officially-required contributions, for services to which patients are entitled (Gaal et al., 
2006). Informal payments may be made in cash or in kind. A Medical University of Hanoi 
study reported that 70% of medical staff interviewed admitted that they sometimes or often 
ask for or accept informal payments, though some consider these payments to be gifts (Tuoi 
Tre, 09/08/2009). In another study, 29% of urban residents who had had contact with health 
services in the last 12 months said that they had to pay bribes, about double the number 
who reported paying bribes in 2007 (Towards Transparency, 2011). A recent survey of 
Vietnamese youth found that 33% of youth who came into contact with medical services 
reported experiencing corruption, and 8% of youth perceived corruption as ―widespread‖ 
(Transparency International, 2011).  
Informal payments appear related to overcrowding and high demand at the tertiary level. 
This in turn creates pressures for patients to bribe doctors and nurses in order to be seen 
sooner, or to be assured of adequate time and attention from providers (T. T. T. Ha et al., 
2011). Yet, informal payments also seem to be driven by cultural expectations and ideas of 
social reciprocity and prevailing attitudes toward corruption. For example, when asked 
whether a government official receiving a ―small gift or money after performing duties‖ was 
corruption, 45% of Vietnamese surveyed said yes, while 37% said no and 18% were 
undecided (World Bank, 2010a). Similarly, when faced with the situation of ―giving an 
additional payment or a gift to a doctor or nurse in order to receive better treatment‖, 32% of 
Vietnamese youth consider this behavior ―not wrong,‖ while an additional 13% of youth 
acknowledge that it is wrong but still ―acceptable‖ (Transparency International, 2011). 
CLIENTS 
An important factor in the control of corruption is external oversight and patient involvement, 
including reporting by media and participation of citizens in facility oversight (Gray-Molina et 
al., 2001). One-party states such as Vietnam tend to be protective of their legitimacy and 
seek to minimize dissent (Jones, 2009). Indeed, it is complicated for civil society 
organizations to be registered as NGOs; the 6-month process is cumbersome and gives 
State institutions numerous opportunities for discretion over authorization to register in 
general, as well as the definition of areas of activity in which the organization can engage.  
At the same time, media reporting on health sector corruption in Vietnam is surprisingly 
robust though mainly focused on issues of petty corruption, i.e. front-line government 
officials or providers accepting bribes or engaged in abuse of office. To assess corruption-
related reporting, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) funded a study which 
examined reporting from five national-level Vietnamese media outlets between 2008 and 
2009 (Acuña-Alfaro, 2009). Topics related to health covered by media reports covered a 
wide-range of areas, including gaining commissions from sale of medicines (18% of the 
stories reported), personal gains from health insurance funds (14%), corrupt practices 
related to financial incentives in management of public hospitals, also known as 
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―socialization‖ of public hospitals in Vietnam (7%), demands for bribes and abuse of patients 
through unnecessary treatment (31%), corruption in licensing (6%), abuses of management 
power in decisions related to properties or donations (11%), and corruption in personnel 
management and oversight of medical facilities (13%). The data showed a rise in reporting, 
with 88 articles published in 2008 and 122 in 2009. In a tightly controlled environment, media 
still exposed more than two stories per week. 
While media reports on corruption may raise public awareness about the problem, this has 
not created a strong anti-corruption movement in the health sector. One reason is that state 
controls limit the space for NGOs to operate, especially organizations seeking to engage the 
public on issues such as government transparency, accountability, and abuse of office. 
Despite perceptions that corruption is prevalent, Vietnamese are generally satisfied with 
health services: over 50% are satisfied with central health services, and 45% are satisfied 
with local health services (World Bank, 2010a). This suggests that people may be resigned 
to corruption. Corruption may even increase patient satisfaction among those with adequate 
financial means, because they are able to pay a bribe to access better and faster care. In 
any case, most people think corruption has not diminished over time (World Bank, 2010a) 
and many citizens are pessimistic about the fight against corruption. For example, when 
asked their reasons for not reporting corruption, 28% of Vietnamese youth surveyed stated 
―it would not help.‖ (Transparency International, 2011)  
ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES IN THE HEALTH SECTOR IN VIETNAM 
Roundtable participants identified and discussed both current and planned initiatives to 
address corruption in Vietnam. Using the framework in Figure 1, we can categorize these 
initiatives in terms of which health system actors are most directly engaged. Table 2 
captures graphically the results of this mapping. This table clearly reveals the dominance of 
government actors in accountability and transparency reforms in the health sector, and the 
relatively limited role of citizens and service users. 
Table 2: Current and Planned Anti-corruption Reforms and Governance Linkages 
 
 
Anti-corruption interventions, current & 
planned in Vietnam 
Governance Linkages by Health System Actor 
Clients/citizens 
 
Government 
regulators & 
payers 
Government 
regulators & 
payers  
Providers 
Clients/citizens 
 Providers 
Redesign of  provider payment systems 
to change incentives 
   
Increased transparency in medicines 
pricing 
   
Expanded avenues for patient feedback    
Reduced informal payments to providers    
Streamlined administrative procedures    
Improved information systems to detect 
and deter fraud 
   
Expanded civil society watchdog  
monitoring and media reporting 
   
Managing conflicts of interest among 
public sector providers 
   
Increased detection and punishment of 
officials who accept bribes, kickbacks 
   
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Two current reforms are attempting to increase the engagement of civil society and service 
users in reforms. Examples include work on payment system reform, and efforts to increase 
accountability through patient feedback.  
Clinical Pathways and Payment System Reform 
Researchers from Vietnamese Health Economics Association (VHEA) are developing a 
case-based reimbursement methodology which they believe can help improve transparency 
and reduce perverse incentives in the health care delivery process. Case-based payments, 
established prospectively based on estimated resource needs for standard care, would 
replace fee-for-service reimbursement. Under this kind of payment system, providers no 
longer have the incentive to use many diagnostic tests or potentially ineffective treatments to 
maximize revenue. 
The research team developed care pathways for normal delivery and the treatment of 
pneumonia and appendicitis. These standard pathways were then compared to actual 
utilization data to reveal problems (for example, clinicians using expensive sutures without 
any clinical indication). In late 2009, the researchers began pilot implementation of the case-
based reimbursement system in two hospitals. The pilot uses standard costs to reimburse 
hospitals for the cases treated, a payment method expected to reduce length of stay and 
unnecessary spending on drugs, diagnostic procedures, and surgery.  
Patient Feedback 
A second example of a citizen/client focused anti-corruption intervention involves increased 
pressure for integrity. The Hanoi National Hospital for Pediatrics introduced a patient 
feedback system in 2009 as a way to improve service delivery after their project won a 
Vietnam Innovation Day (VID) award sponsored by donors. The hospital had problems with 
overcrowding and waiting times of 4-5 hours.   
The intervention team developed six tools to collect feedback from doctors and patients. 
Patients responded positively to being asked their opinions and were eager to participate. 
Data from the study are being used to set benchmarks and to identify specific issues for 
problem-solving. The feedback included information on whether patients felt compelled to 
pay informal fees, and has contributed to increased transparency about this practice. 
PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IN PURSUING HEALTH SECTOR ANTI-CORRUPTION 
INITIATIVES 
The two examples of experimentation with citizen/client focused reforms notwithstanding, the 
mapping of reforms in Table 2 reveals the predominant role of government actors in current 
and planned reform initiatives. The institutional factors constraining anti-corruption reforms 
highlighted in Table 1 offer some explanatory clues. For example, while NGOs are allowed 
to exist they are scrutinized by government and their independence is limited. In such an 
environment, independent structures which could increase accountability for medical care—
such as the Medical Council regulatory authority proposed in the draft Law on Examination 
and Treatment—are too uncomfortable for government and may be considered a 
circumvention of state responsibilities. In addition, the overall direction of public 
administration reform in the country—to decentralize and streamline—leads to a climate 
where people may not adequately consider the risks involved in decentralized regulatory 
authority and the special requirements for quality control in the health sector (Wedeen et al., 
2011). Spending to strengthen quality monitoring, complaint systems, and audit functions 
may be seen as a low priority in such an environment. 
A major challenge to government stewardship in the health sector is the government’s desire 
to both operate and manage health care delivery systems and set policies and regulations 
for financing, purchasing, and monitoring quality outcomes. There will be endemic corruption 
until the government realizes it cannot be both a ―player‖ and a ―referee‖ at the same time. 
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To effectively mainstream the national anti-corruption approaches (described in Table 1) in 
the health sector, given the institutional constraints, adaptation and support are needed. The 
following options could improve the prospect for success. These are based on the 
discussions at the Roundtable, and are supported by experience and analysis in other 
countries as well. 
Approach 1: Enhanced administrative oversight 
Many of the health sector anti-corruption strategies listed in Table 2 focus on creating 
effective checks and balances through administrative oversight. Yet, capacity constraints 
impede the government from implementing these approaches. Greater attention is needed to 
identify and fill gaps in government capacity for implementing regulatory action, especially 
through stronger information and audit systems. Weak accounting systems are risk factors 
which allow embezzlement, as shown in Zambia. There, a lack of procedures to monitor 
health spending in relation to performance, and a long and cumbersome audit process, were 
causal factors in a $4.8 million embezzlement detected in 2009. While procedures were in 
place to follow up on funds and results, these procedures were not followed (Pereira, 2009), 
and although previous audits had revealed many problems, audit findings were not released 
in a timely manner and were not acted upon by the legislature. 
Information systems can also help to deter corruption through improved transparency of 
procurement decisions and doctors’ prescription practices. Monitoring of doctors’ 
prescription practices can detect relationships between physicians and pharmaceutical 
companies which can be investigated for kickbacks. Investment in these types of 
management systems may work because it fits within the strong executive structure favored 
in Vietnam. Oversight capacity must also be strengthened to assure that complaint 
mechanisms are being used by clients and staff, and provide adequate protection to 
complainants.  
Approach 2: Transparency, citizen monitoring, and participation 
Constructive engagement of clients and citizens is helpful in policy dialogue and 
collaborative problem solving, while citizen monitoring can help promote transparency and 
accountability. The Affiliated Network for Social Accountability for East Asia and the Pacific 
(ANSA EAP) has developed many tools and methods for public engagement to increase 
accountability, and has been involved in initiatives such as training youth to monitor local 
service delivery in Cambodia, citizen report cards in the Philippines, and participatory 
budgeting in Indonesia (www.ansa.eap.net). In addition to capacity strengthening of civil 
society organizations, Vietnam should loosen State controls constricting the establishment 
and operation of NGOs engaged in advocacy. This will allow them to function more 
effectively as watchdogs and increase opportunities for citizen voice in the policy-making 
process.  
Civil society organizations engaged in research also have a role in promoting transparency 
through data gathering and use. For example, if public and private providers are required to 
disclose procurement bidding information, external monitoring groups could examine the 
losing bids compared to winning bids, creating more pressure for accountability on decisions 
to procure cost-effectively. Right now, winning bids may be neither technically better nor 
cheaper than their competitors, but only winning bids are disclosed.  
In the Philippines, Procurement Watch (www.procurementwatch.org) has been engaged in 
building accountability into government procurement systems by measuring fair market 
prices and comparing them to what is actually paid. This type of approach has also been 
implemented in Argentina and Bolivia to deter corruption and inefficiency (W. Savedoff, 
2008). Analysis of insurance claim databases is another area where monitoring may help to 
detect where hospitals are abusing the reimbursement system by ordering excessive testing.  
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STRUCTURAL POLICY REFORM TO REDUCE INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION 
The balancing of Vietnam’s market-driven economic reform agenda within its Socialist 
political framework suggests that the policy reform process must include more engagement 
of political leadership, the press, and the public at earlier stages. Such engagement can 
create stronger incentives for government responsiveness (Brinkerhoff & Bossert, 2008). 
Technical stakeholders must learn to discern and appreciate political interests, and develop 
skills in policy advocacy. The Reform Impact Assessment process can be used more 
effectively if it is implemented early in the law development process and used to formally 
assess the costs and impact on quality, safety, and consumer satisfaction of reform options. 
Health sector reform efforts should be attentive to those issues where concern about 
corruption is strong. For example, inappropriate drug promotion and physician-pharma 
interactions may lead to higher prices and inappropriate prescribing. These things can be 
measured and monitored. The WHO has created process indicators for transparent and 
accountable drug promotion practices as part of the Good Governance in Medicines (GGM). 
The GGM program approach to increasing transparency in public pharmaceutical systems 
includes three steps: risk assessment, development of a national framework for responding 
to identified needs, and implementation of approaches such as procedures for disclosure 
and management of conflict of interest, web-based medicines registration and licensing 
systems, and other interventions. To date, 26 countries are participating in the GGM, 
including Cambodia, Malaysia, Mongolia and the Philippines. 
Another important area of patient discontent is informal payments. Informal payments are a 
complex problem, exacerbated by underfunding of public entitlements to service, 
overcrowding in tertiary facilities, providers who are inadequately paid, and lack of 
transparency. While some hospitals have tried to control informal payments, there has been 
limited success in Vietnam. Government is essentially licensing itself, and may not be likely 
to condemn government-run institutions where informal payments are prevalent. While 
patient complaint mechanisms exist, their independence and effectiveness has been 
questioned, and public trust is low. Greater transparency could help create pressure for 
policy change. Civil society organizations could try to provide patients with information on 
their rights and official fee policies. In an environment where there is political pressure on 
government to reduce informal payments, provider payment reform, which links 
remuneration more closely to performance indicators, is a strategy that has had some 
success in Cambodia and Kyrgyzstan (Barber et al., 2004; Gaal et al., 2010; Miller & Vian, 
2010).   
CONCLUSION 
Controlling corruption in the Vietnamese health sector, as in any country, requires changes 
in institutions, attitudes, and behavior. Controlling corruption is a critical component of 
governance and is essential to achieve health sector goals of improved quality of care and 
equity in access and outcomes. Government, providers, and citizens and service users each 
have a role to play in promoting good governance for better health. Key to success is 
unlocking the incentives that enable and motivate health system actors to fulfill their roles, 
and adapting strategies to work within and overcome institutional constraints.  
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